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ENTREPRENEUR- INVESTOR NEGOTIATIONS: INVESTIGATING THE POWER GAP 
Karen Page, University of Wyoming 
Robert Sprague, University of Wyoming 
Federal Securities Laws are designed to ensure that investors are provided with sufficient information to 
make an informed in vestmelll. These Laws presume that investors are relatively nai've and powerless 
compared to the relatively sophisticated and powe~ful sellers of securities. In the new venture arena, 
however, it is often the case that sellers, the entrepreneurs, are relatively nai've and powerless compared to 
the investors, who tend to be expert in venture finance. This paper explores these heretofore unexamined 
power imbalances and presents attributes of the entrepreneurs and their resources that may affect 
entrepreneurs' ability to negotiate with venture capitalists. 
INTRODUCTION 
The iconic perspective of modern entreprene urship 
envis ions a handful of bright, young entrepreneur 
developing their product with minimal resources, 
sometimes litera ll y in a garage, onl y to be "di scovered" 
by venture capitali sts w ho fund and muture the fledg ling 
enterp1i se until it becomes a publi c corporation and 
leader in its industry. The fairy tai l includes the 
tTansformation of the yo ung, idea li st ic entTepreneurs into 
captains of their industry. 
Rea li ty, howeve r, does not a lways comport with thi s 
idy llic v1cw . Anecdotal ev idence suggests the 
entrepreneurs face a much harsher rea lity as they place 
confidence in ventu re capitali sts w hose bus iness models 
are based on generating enormous returns on a sma ll 
percentage of the ir many in vestments, rather than 
nurtu1ing fl edgling en b·eprene urs (Holding and Carl sen , 
1999) . Neverthe less, some entrepreneurs do very we ll 
and recei ve deal tern1s that a ll ow them to gro w their 
companies with the appropri ate amount of attention from 
the investo rs. The aim of thi s paper is to ex plore the 
heretofore unexam ined power imba lances between 
enb·epreneurs and in vestors and to postulate some sources 
of power that may enabl e entTepreneurs to negotiate 
effecti ve ly with inves tors. 
Business Start- Ups and Venture Ca pital 
Because a start -up bus iness does not have an 
estab lished product in the market, there are gener::tll y 
li ttle or no revenues in the business' nascent yea rs . A 
small , sta rt-up bus iness ha a var iet·y of sources from 
which it may draw operating capita l: the sav ings of the 
0\\11ers; bank loa ns. pa rti cul a rl y those guaranteed by the 
Sma ll Bus iness Association ; fri ends and re lati ves; 
wea lthy indi viduals - often referred to as '·ange ls"; and 
46 
venture capitali sts. 
Loans to the business are li mited to the extent of the 
coll atera l of the owners and create a repayment burden 
whil e the bus iness is still developing. Selling part of the 
bus iness to an investor offers a viab le alternative, as the 
amount of in v ;; ted fund s is sb-uctured on the future 
income of the enterpri se (rather than the current 
unencumbered assets of its owners), and there is no 
repa yment burden. 
Venture capitali sts ha ve become a significant source 
of new venture financin g in recent years . By 2003 , there 
were nea rly 2,000 venture fund s actively managing over 
$25 0 bill ion in business in vestments (Leavitt, 2005). The 
typical ventu re capi ta l process is for a venture capita l 
fim1 to fom1 a limi ted partnership , with itse lf as the 
genera l pann er. Limited partners arc then sol ic ited to 
pledge fund s to a parti cu la r venture fund . The limited 
partners are usua ll y institutional in vestors and high-
wea lth individua ls. T he venture capita l firm manages the 
fund , se lecting which ventures to invest in. The venture 
cap ita l finn collects a set management fee , as well as 
shares in pos iti ve retums eam ed by the fund (Bankman & 
Co le, 200 1). 
AJ1ge ls, 1n contTast, are genera ll y high-wea lth 
indi viduals who in vest directl y in a busin ess at a very 
ear ly staJi-up phase. T he avai labi lity of angels has 
progressed beyond just ' ' fr iends and fami li es. " Ange ls 
have become more prominent and accessib le, even 
banding together into organ izations to share leads and 
informat ion (Leavitt, 2005) . 
Whether the initial venture fundin g is provided by an 
ange l or venture ca pita lists, it is ex pected that there will 
be subsequent rounds of fin anc in g as the business 
deve lops, often in vo lving more than one venture capi ta l 
fund (Gom1an and Sahlman , 1989). The investors' goal Is 
a liquidi ty event , usua ll y in the form of an ini tia l publlc 
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offering (IPO) of the stock of the venture . The IPO 
creates a market for the stock of the venture, allowing the 
investors to sell their ownership interest in the venture-
theoretically for a substantial profit. Even where the 
investors and the entrepreneur are equally committed to 
maximizing shareholder wealth , they may have recurring 
disagreements regarding how to prioritize operating goals 
(Sapienza & Gupta, 1994). T he entrepreneur 's ultimate 
goal is to build a viable business . The investors' " long 
term" goal is a positive return on the investment 
portfolio, of which the entrepreneur 's company is just 
one part, within 7-12 yea rs, the typical life of a venture 
fund (Nesheim, 2000). As a result , investors and the 
entrepreneur have different, and poss ibly conflicting, 
priorities. 
Investing m small , sta rt-up ventures invol ve 
significant risk (Sapienza & G upta , 1994; Utset, 2002). 
Risk can have its rewards: venture funds collectively 
reported returns of 150% in 1999 . But risk also 
sometimes means loss: as venture funds co ll ective ly 
reported returns worse than negative 25% in 2002 
(Cumming & Macintosh, 2004). One study has indicated 
that approximately 7% of investments account for more 
than 60% of venture capitalists' profits, whi le one-third 
of investments result in (sometimes tota l) losses (Bhjde, 
1992). 
There are signifi cant unknown va ri abl es assoc iated 
with start-up ventures. By definition , the bus iness model 
of a start-up has not been tested agai nst an actua l market. 
Most start-ups do not yet even have a product. It 1s 
unknown whether the idea can be converted to a 
marketable product, whether a competiti ve product is 
about to be intToduced in the market, or whether the 
entrepreneur can manage an operational and growing 
business (Sapienza & Gupta, 1994). lJl addition , each 
party 's self-interest may increase the ri sk of failure. 
Venture capitali sts are on ly wi lling to provide the 
minimum fund s necessary for the venture to meet di screte 
milestones, thereby minimi zing the venture capitali sts ' 
risk if the venture appears unsuccessful in its ear ly stages . 
At the same time, the entrepreneur is loath to give up too 
much ownership and contTOl in the business . "Thus both 
venture capita li sts and entrepreneurs willingly conspire to 
impose stringent limits on the res iliency of their 
enterpri ses" (Gonnan & Sa hlman, 1989:238). Whi le 
venture capita li sts and entrepreneurs may in itially believe 
they have common goa ls and are a partnership , when 
things go badly, the ir interests diverge (Gorman & 
Sahlman, 1989). 
Venture capita li sts attempt to contro l ri sk through 
governance procedures. Studies indi cate tha t venture 
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capita lists pursue less industry and geographi c 
divers ifi cat ion when in vestment ri sk is hi gh; therefore 
they manage ri sk thro ugh monitoring and in vo lvement 
rather than through di versification (Sapienza & Gupta , 
1994). When dec idin g whether to fu nd a new venture, 
venture cap itali sts must consider more than the potential 
success of the venture, and hence the pos iti ve return on 
investment. Ventu re capitali sts must also decide how best 
to structure the financing to protect the ir own interests 
whi le simultaneous ly enhancing the likelihood that the 
new venture w ill succeed. The foundation of thi s 
structure is govemance and control (Bam ey et a!. , 1989; 
U tset, 2002). 
A ltho ugh venture cap itali sts do not usual ly purchase a 
maj orit·y of the venture's stock, they often purchase 
enough to contro l the company 's board of d irectors, 
w hich has the ultimate responsibility of managing the 
company. TJl add ition, venture capitalists provide 
finan c ing in stages, rep leni shing capital on ly if the 
ventl1re remai ns a potentia lly viab le in vestment. F ina ll y, 
the ventl1re cap ita li sts w ill req uire di sincenti ves for the 
entrepreneur to ex it from the venture, particularl y by 
requiring that entrepreneurs se ll their interest in the 
company should they leave (Utset, 2002) . 
With thi s level of control, venture capitali sts can exert 
power in a number of ways . They can terminate the 
entrepreneur if they beli eve mo re competent seni or 
management is needed and the entrepreneur is no longer 
necessary for the viabil it y of the venture. Accord ing to 
venture cap it a li sts, the most s ignificant reaso n new 
ventures fai l is beca use of ineffective senior management, 
meanin g that venture ca pitali sts wi ll " frequentl y" fire the 
origi na l senior m::magement (Gom1an & Sah lman, 1989) . 
Indeed, so1 e enh·epreneurs have thought their dreams of 
a successful start-up were reali zed when venture 
capi ta li sts :1grced to in vest, on ly to find that they were 
left wi th nothing (Holding and Carlsen, 1999). 
U ltimate ly, if the venture capitali sts be li eve the venture is 
no ionger viable , they can li quidate it, w hich includes 
havin g the company buy back the venture ca pita li sts' 
stock ( if there are assets to pay for the rede mpti on) 
(Utset, 2002) . 
T he entrepreneur , understandably, will more than 
likely fight an y termin atio n or liquidatiOn decis io n by the 
venture capit:1li sts . The entrepreneur IS a lso not 
necessa ril y power less, parti cularl y if the entrepreneur 
ho ld s the kno\\' ledgc necessary to m:1ke the venture 
viab le. Thi s m:1 y set up a connict between the 
e ntrep rene ur and the , ·enture capitali sts that ultimate ly 
may be destructi w to the ventu re . I r the venture 
capitali sts a rc at odds with the entrepreneur, but the 
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entrepreneur is too va luable to the venture to tem1inate, 
the result may be reta li ation. 
Many of these issues are covered by the tem1 sheets 
nego ti ated by the parties a t the time of the investment. 
The extent to whic h these ten11S favor either the 
entrepreneur or the investor depends on the relati ve 
power of the parti es. 
Power 
M ost definiti ons of power take as the ir root Weber ' s 
( 1947) c lass ic de finition o f power as the probabili ty that a 
person can carry o ut hi s or her will despite res istance. 
F rench and R aven ( 1959) rarefied Weber 's definiti on by 
determining fi ve bases of power: ( 1) reward power; 
(2) coerc ive power; (3 ) expert power; (4) legitimate 
power; and (5) referent power. Emerson ( 1962:32) argued 
that "power is a property of the socia l re lation; it is not an 
attribute of an actor. " T hus, power onl y ari ses within a 
parti c ular context between two or more actors. 
In the context of tra nsactions, power can detem1ine 
the allocat ion of rewards of any agreement (Kim, 1997; 
Mann ix, 1993; Pinkley e t a !. , 1994). Consequently, the 
greater one party's power re lative to the other party 's, the 
more resources the more powerful pa rty can clai m (Kim 
et a!. , 2005). Bacharach and Lawler's (198 1) 
comprehen sive review of the re levant literature suggests 
that negot ia tors who are perce ived as having grea te r 
bargai n ing power than their opponents can enfo rce the ir 
wi II. Fw1her, negotiators with lower percc i ved power 
genera ll y cannot and do not res ist the demands of more 
powerfu l opponents (llorai & Tedeschi , 1969; M ichener, 
Law ler, & Bacharach, 1973). Converse ly, when the 
power of two parties is equa l, each s ide is be tter ab le to 
res ist the domineering behav ior of the other (cf. PinkJey, 
Nea le, & Benn ett, 1994) . 
T hus, when an entrepreneurs are negotiating w ith 
potential investors, the re lat ive power of the 
en trepreneurs and in vestor large ly detem1ine who 
rece ive the greater benefit from the in vestment. 
Neverthe less, the entrepreneurs' persona l and reso urce 
attTibutes ca n en hance their power re lat ive to the in vestor. 
In thi paper, we generate e leven propos iti ons rega rding 
potential sources of power to entrepreneurs with respect 
to investors. 
So urces of En trepreneurs' Power 
Certain ly many venture fi na nce dea ls conc lude with 
terms that are favo rab le to both parti es. We contend that 
entreprene urs that engage in suc h positi ve dea ls have 
more power with respect to in vestors than entTepreneurs 
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who accept less advantageous terms . From whence does 
thi s power derive? We develop eleven propositions 
setting forth attributes of entrepreneurs or their resources 
that may con tribute to the entrepreneurs' power. In the 
context of the propositions that follow, the "entrepreneur" 
inc ludes a ll founders involved in the management 
dec isions o f the startup. 
Attributes of the Entrepreneur 
Entrepreneurs vary in terms of financial and technical 
exper1ise and experi ence. W e believe four of these factors 
may be particularl y important in affecting entrepreneurs' 
power vis-a- vis the investor: (1) experience in new 
venture finan ce; (2) general financial expenence; 
(3) ex perti se rn the entrepreneur ' s industry; (4) 
negotiatin g experi ence; and (5) skin in the game. 
Experience in New Venture Finance 
While many enb·eprene ur are new to the market for 
venture fin anc in,, other entrepreneurs have repeated 
ex peri ence. Westhead, Ucbasa ran, and Wright (2005) 
describe entrepreneurs as "nov ice" entrepreneurs, who 
have no pri or business OWllership experi ence; "seri al" 
entrepreneurs, who have so ld or closed a business in 
whi ch they had an own ership stake and who eurTently 
have an ownership sta ke in new, independent business; 
and " portfo lio" entrepreneurs, w ho ha ve concunent 
ownership stakes in two or more independent bus inesses . 
T he la t1 cr two ca tego ri es suggest that experi ence in 
en trepreneurship increase the entreprene ur ' s power for 
three reasons. Fi rst, ex peri ence prov ides the entrepreneur 
with a bas is for compari son w hen negoti atin g with 
in vestors (Babcock e t a!. , 2005). Second, an ex peri ence 
curve e ffect may enable the entrepreneur to capitalize on 
hi s o r her exi sting knowl edge base and intemal 
infrastTucture, thereby reduc ing costs of capital (Reagans 
e t a!. , 2005) Third , ex peri ence is likely to generate 
cred ib ility on the part o f the entTepreneur (cf. Brokaw & 
Mc Devitt, 1994). As Westhead and Wright (1999) and 
MacMill an, Siega l, and SubbaNaras imha ( 1985) found , 
the entrepreneur 's ex peri ence i used by potenti a l 
investors to screen applications for assistance. Thus, not 
onl y w ill ex peri ence help the entrepreneur to see the 
re lati onship with the in vestor and the actual tem1s in a 
more sophi sti cated li ght, ex peri ence wi ll al so a ll ow the 
entrepreneur to be seen by the in vestor as more capabl e 
and credible. 
Proposition I: Entrepreneurs with more 
entrepreneuri al experi ence will have more power 
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relative to investors than entrepreneurs with less 
entrepreneurial experience. 
Financial Expertise 
Expert power is demonstrated when an indi vidual has 
knowledge or expertise relevant to others (French and 
Raven, 1959). Fiske (1961) suggests that the hallmark of 
expertise is the ability to adjust one 's skill s to be adapti ve 
and successful even in the face of changes in si tuational 
demands . In ventme finance situations, it can generally 
be assumed that the investor has more financial 
knowledge and expertise than most entrepreneurs. 
However, to the extent that the entrepreneurs have their 
own financial expertise, the entrepreneurs' power relative 
to the investor will be enhanced. 
Proposition 2: Entrepreneurs with fi nancial 
expertise wi ll have more power relative to 
investors than entrepreneurs without financ ia l 
expertise. 
Rare Substantive Expertise 
Rare substantive expertise in the entrepreneurs' fi eld 
may also enhance the entrepreneurs' power, particularly 
when the field is a popular one for venture capi ta l. Where 
the value of the enterprise lies within the entrepreneur, 
then it is less likely that the in vestor will jeopardize the 
relationship with the entrepreneur than if the va lue lay 
within phys ical assets or intellectual property. 
Proposition 3: Entrepreneurs with rare expertise in 
their fi elds wi ll have more power relat ive to 
investors than entrepreneurs without rare experti se 
in their fields. 
Negotiating Experience 
Specific experience or training in negot iations shou ld 
also give entrepreneurs power in their negotiations with 
investors. Neale and Northcraft ( 1986) fo und that while 
both expert and amateur negot iators were ab le to reach 
integrative ("win-win") solutions over time, expert 
negotiators were more integrati ve ea rl y 111 the 
negotiations and tended to secure hi gher average 
outcomes than amateur negotiators. Thompson ( 1990) 
found that experienced negotiators made more accurate 
judgments about the other party ' s pri oriti es and were 
more likely to negotiate more favo rab le agreements. 
We can expec t, then , that entTepreneurs who are 
experi enced negotiators will be ale to negoti ate more 
favorabl e terms than wi ll novi ce negotiators. 
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Proposition 4: Entrepreneurs with specific 
training or experience in negotiation s wi ll have 
more power relative to in vestors than entrepreneurs 
without training or experience in negotiations. 
Skin in the Game 
' ·Skin in the game" is a term coined by billionaire 
investor Warren Buffet to refer to personal investment in 
an enterpri se (Morring & Taverna, 2005). Scholars and 
commentators alike have suggested that a party ' s skin in 
the game increases personal commitment to a successful 
venture (Tennant, 2005 ; Koehn, 2005; Gray, 2004 ; 
B ischel, 2004) . Anecdota l evidence suggests that venture 
capita li sts are conginizant of thi s concept. As 
entrepreneur Glenn Cornett explained, venture capitalists 
di scounted the value of hi s business at an early stage 
because so littl e money had been put into it (Cornett, 
2005) . Accordingly, a greater persona l investment by the 
entrpreneurs can be expected to Improve the 
entrepreneurs' negotiating position. 
Proposition 5: EntTepreneurs with more persona l 
financ ial investment in the start up will have more 
power relative to investors than entrepreneurs with 
less personal financia l investment in the start up. 
Attributes of the Ent1·epreneur's Resources 
Even vvhere an entTepreneur has some personal 
attributes that may be advantageous in negotiations with 
in ves tors, enh·epreneurs likel y to strengthen their power 
through the accumu lat ion of certa in resources that are 
also like ly to enhance power. These include (1) stTong 
intellectual nropeity, (2) loya l board members, (3) hi gh 
status alli ance partners, (4) hi gh status lega l counsel, (5) 
an advisory board, and (6) the length of time the start up 
has been in business . 
Strong Intellectual Property 
Holding and Carl sen ( 1999) report an incident that 
occun·ed in 199 1: It wa s every entrepreneur's worst 
ni ghtmare . 
One day EP Techno logies was seeking venture capita l 
fina nci ng to expand its medical equipment business . The 
next day an entirely new company - financed by the same 
venture capita li sts - arose to make exactl y the sa me 
product for exac tl y the same market. 
T heft of inte ll ectual property, euphemi sti ca ll y ca ll ed 
·'competiti ve in te lli gence," is an import:mt concern for 
every entTepreneur. Legitimate in vestors are acute ly 
concemed with the protectability of entrepreneurs' 
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inte ll ectua l propeny (Klein , 2005; Schneider, 2002)); the 
tronger the protection , the more va luabl e is the propeny. 
Le s legitimate investors will be concerned for other 
reasons; the weaker the protection , the easie r it is to 
appropriate. In e ither event, strong intell ectual proper1y 
protection should provide more power to entrepreneurs 
than weak inte ll ectual propeny protec ti on 
Proposition 6: Entrepreneurs who have strong 
intellectual propeny protection will have more 
power relative to in vestors than entTepreneurs with 
weak intellectual property protection. 
Loyal Board Members 
H old ing and Carl sen (1999) report another inc ident 
that highlights in the importance of loya lty: In June 1997, 
Shyam Das sat down for sodas with venture capita li st 
Jeffrey Drazan at the Peppermil l Restaurant in C upertino. 
Drazan and hi s firm, Sierra Ventures, had put about $7 
million into the compan y Das founded the year before, 
and after a few minutes of small talk , Drazan sai d he 
wanted another Sierra d irec tor on the board. Das was 
wary. For year . he had worked a lone to perfect the 
company's product - an ingenious device capab le of 
storing more data on a co mputer di sk than an yone 
thought po s ible. And he co uld fee l Drazan pry ing it 
away. B ut Drazan assu red him they wo uld "al ways be 
together," so Das relented. lt was a criti ca l mi stake. 
Two month later. Das ,,·as out. fired from hi s own 
compan y - with D razan 's nc'' director cast ing the 
deciding vote. And although Da ::, s till he ld mil lions of 
hare of company stock. he sa id the directors eventua lly 
found a way to betray him one more lime. "When I 
handed over thi s company." Das said . "It was just like 
losing a child." Das · experience illustrates the importan ce 
of personal loyalty on the board. Whi le it is often the case 
that in vestors will ins ist on board sea ts, and even board 
control, loyal board members provide at least some buffer 
to thi S pO\\er . 
Propo~ition 7: Entrepreneurs with loya l board 
members on the board wi II have more power 
relative to mvestors than en treprene urs wit hout 
loyal board members on the board. 
Hi gh Statu~ A lli ance Partner~ 
A number of sc holars have argued that if an 
mdi\ 1dual"'> partne rs posses'> cons iderable legitimacy or 
sta tus. then the individual may dcri,·c leg itimacy or status 
through that affiliation. T hi'> borrowed legitimacy or 
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statu has been shown to have a number of positive 
economi c benefits for the actor, ranging from survival to 
organizational growth and profitability (Baum & Oliver, 
1992; Podoln y & Phillips, 1996; Podolny 1993). In one 
of the more compelling demonstrations of the economic 
va lue of ti es to hi gh-status actors, Stuart and his 
co lleagues ( 1997) examined the economic effects of 
interorgani zational networks of privately held 
biotechnology firm s. Stuart and hi s colleagues found that 
an affiliation wi th a prominent alliance partner increased 
the marke t value of the biotechnology firm. Consistent 
w ith an interpretati on of these ties as carriers of 
leg itimacy, Stuart and hi s associates found that the effect 
of affiliation s vari es in verse ly with the age ofthe start-up . 
Tn other words, yo ung start-ups benefit more from the 
status of the ir network partners than do older start-ups. 
Proposition 8: Entrepreneurs with high status 
a lliance partners wi ll have more power relative to 
in vesto rs than entrepreneurs w ithout hi gh status 
a lli ance partn ·s. 
High Status Legal Co unsel 
Just as hi gh status a lli ance partners may be a s ignal of 
quality and hence give an entrepreneur more bargaining 
power, so too may the status of the entrepreneur 's genera l 
coun se l. Some law firms are known in the venture 
finance industry as hi gher status and more connected, 
knowl edgeab le, and capab le than other law firms 
(Ph il lip & Zuckerman, 2002; Phillips, 2001 ). Thus, such 
law firm s may pro vide the entTeprene ur with power 
rela tive to the in vesto rs in a t least two ways. First, these 
law firm s may suggest a certa in sophisti cation on the part 
of the entTepreneur that will trans late into more respect. 
Second, the ex perti se o f the law £irms themselves in the 
domain of venture capital should inure to the benefit of 
the entTepreneurs through good lega l advice. 
Proposition 9: Entreprene urs with hi gh status 
lega l counse l w ill have more power relative to 
in ves tors than en trepreneurs wi th low status lega l 
counsel. 
Advi so r y Board 
Fox ( 1982), m the I larva rd Bus in ess Review, 
recommended that entrepreneurs c reate "quasi-boards of 
direc tors·· or adv isory boards to a ll ow the entrepreneurs 
to ga ther ex pert adv ice w itho ut the impos ing on the 
adv i ors the lega l or fiduc iary burdens of being board 
members. These advi sors can offer advice w ithout 
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becoming embroiled in operations or politics. Such 
advice can benefit the entrepreneur in two ways when 
negotiating with investors. First, the existence of the 
board of advisors signal s that the entrepreneur is wi lling 
to listen to independent, outside adv ice. Second, the 
advisors can provide invaluable adv ice with respect to the 
negotiations themselves. 
Proposition 10: Entrepreneurs with an advi sory 
board will have more power relative to investors 
than entrepreneurs with no advi sory board. 
Length of Time in Business 
In his classic essay introducing the concept of 
" liability of newness," Stinchcombe ( 1965) argued that 
new organizations in new economi c sectors are at a 
disadvantage with respect to older, establi shed fim1s . In 
other words, start ups are more like ly to fail than older 
companies for a variety of reasons bundled under the 
concept of liability of newn ess (Gruber & Henkel , 2006; 
Aspelund, Berg-Utby & Skjevda l, 2005 ; Fowler, S.W ., 
Lawrence, T.B. , & Morse, E.A. 2004; Deeds & 
Rothaermel , 2003). It is reasonable to suppose, 
entrepreneurs that have been operatin g the ir companies 
longer will not only have a greater chance of survi val , but 
will also be ab le to leverage the longevity into 
negotiating power. Thus, though not a resource that can 
be purchased or otherwise acquired except by the passage 
of time, the longevity of the business may al so be an 
important attribute of the entrepreneuria l venture . 
Proposition 11: A startup 's length of time 1n 
business is positivel y cone lated with the 
entrepreneur ' s power relative to in vestors. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the assumptions of federal and state Blue 
Sky laws, investors in new ventures tend to be 
sophisticated and experienced and can use their 
sophistication and experience to take advantage o f 
relatively na·ive en trepreneurs. Not a ll venture finance 
deals are bad for entrepreneurs, however, suggesting that 
the attracti veness of the dea l for the entTepreneur is 
contingent on a variety of factors. In thi s paper, we have 
identified nine poss ible contingenc ies ba sed upon the 
attributes of the entrepreneur and the entTepreneur 's 
resources. Specifica ll y, we have suggested that the 
enh·epreneur 's experi ence in new venture finance, 
financial experti se, experti se in his or her fi eld , and 
negotiating experience will pos iti ve ly a ffect the 
5 1 
Joum31 of 13usincss 3nd Leadership : Rese3rc h. Pracricc. and Tcachmg 
entrepreneur's abi li ty to negotiate pos iti ve deals. We 
have further suggested that the strength of the 
entrepreneur 's resources will pos iti ve ly bene fit 
entrepreneurs in their negoti ations with in ve tors. These 
resources inc! ude protectab le inte ll ec tua I property, loya I 
board members, high status alli ance partners and lega l 
counsel, and an advi sory board . 
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